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ROLE OF THE COURTS IN ORDERING ARBITRATION WHEN THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT ALLEGEDLY
VIOLATES THE SHERMAN ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
'Whether a party to a collective bargaining agreement can lawfully re-
fuse to arbitrate a claim either because the contract arguably excluded
it from arbitration or because the claim was founded on a clause allegedly
violating the antitrust laws was the subject of the dispute in Associated
lilk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753.1 Because that decision con-
sidered both labor and antitrust policy in a single suit to compel arbitra-
tion, it will be used throughout this discussion as the factual basis for an
analysis of certain questions as yet unresolved in both areas of law.
The Associated Milk Dealers controversy arose over the interpretation
of a standard area labor contract between Chicago area dairies and the
milk driver's union. When the union refused to submit the dispute to
arbitration, the employers' association and individual dairies brought suit
to compel arbitration under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.' On a motion for summary judgment the district court ordered arbi-
tration over the union's assertions that the parties did not intend to sub-
mit the dispute to arbitration and that part of the contract violated the
antitrust laws. The Seventh Circuit reversed the order and remanded the
case to the district court for a presentation of evidence on both of the
union's claims. The action is noteworthy first for its cautious approach
to "national labor policy [favoringj arbitration"' and second for its anti-
trust policy, each of which will be discussed separately below.
Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. (AMDI) and the Chicago Area Dairy-
men's Association (CADA) represented a number of employers in the
1967 negotiations for a new standard Chicago area contract. In antici-
pation of competition from a new milk processing plant then under con-
struction by the Jewel supermarket chain, the employers sought to protect
themselves should they be placed at a competitive disadvantage by the
new plant. As a result the final contract provided:
The Union shall furnish the Dealers a letter of understanding that if
certain conditions come into the market which would create an inequitable
1422 F.2d 546 (7th Cit. 1970).
2 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964) provides:
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship.
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court in the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.2 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
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situation relative to store operations, they would meet with the dealers for
the purpose of negotiating an appropriate adjustment of the situation.4
The letter read in part:
If certain conditions come into the market, which would create an in-
equitous (sic) situation relative to the store operations, or a similar situ-
ation effecting retail, the Union will meet with the Dealers upon written
request for the purpose of negotiating an appropriate adjustment of the
situation.5
In addition, the contract contained a broad arbitration clause which
specifically excepted certain grievances from the arbitration process (the
Jewel dairy problem was not one of them).6 Finally, Article 20 contained
the "most favored nation" provision which was later attacked as a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws:
Should the Union hereafter enter into any agreement with any milk
dealer upon terms and conditions more advantageous to such dealer than
the terms and conditions of this Agreement, or should the Union sanction
a course of conduct by any milk dealer who has signed this form of agree-
ment enabling him to operate under more advantageous terms and condi-
tions than those provided for in this Agreement the Employer shall be
entitled to adopt such terms and conditions in lieu of those contained in
this Agreement.7
Subsequently, the union signed a collective bargaining agreement with
the new Hillfarm Dairy division of the Jewel chain, which contained
terms more favorable to Hillfarm than those provided in the standard area
contract. AMDI sought to adopt these terms for its members pursuant
to the most favored nation clause and when the union refused to accept
the changes, AMDI demanded arbitration with the results noted above.
II. THE DUTY To ARBITRATE
Common law refusal to order the specific performance of an arbitra-
tion agreement 8 was laid to rest in the area of national labor relations by
4 422 F.2d at 549.
51d.
6 "Any matter in dispute, between the Union and Employer [excepting wages and hours, as
set forth in Articles 4, 37 and 41, and contributions to all existing Funds, as set forth in Articles
45, 47 and 48 and questions of jurisdictional matters, as decided by Teamsters Joint Council
No. 25, which cannot be settled], shall be referred by either party to an Industry Labor Com-
mittee consisting of three [3) representatives of Employers, parties to this Agreement, and
three [3] representatives of the Union. It shall be the duty of this Committee to hear and dis-
pose of all complaints raised by either party to this Agreement concerning violations thereof
that cannot be settled amicably between the parties. If this Committee is equally divided on
any such complaint the Chief Justice of the Circuit Court or his nominee shall be called in to
act as the impartial member of said Committee, and his decision shall be final. No action shall
be taken by either party to the Agreement pending the decision of this Committee." Id. at
549-50.
7 422 F.2d at 549.
8 See, e.g., discussion in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) and In-
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the Lincoln Mills' decision, in which the Supreme Court held that such
agreements were specifically enforceable under § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA).'0 It had been previously argued
by some that § 301(a) was merely jurisdictional in allowing federal courts
to entertain labor suits without regard to diversity of citizenship or the
amount in controversy." But the Court rejected that interpretation of
the statute and held that § 301(a) "authorizes federal courts to fashion
a body of federal law for the enforcement of ...collective bargaining
agreements .... ,1*2 One of the tenets of that body of federal law was
that an agreement to arbitrate, being the "quid pro quo for an agreement
not to strike,"13 is specifically enforceable.
The Lincoln Mills decision left undecided several questions which
later confronted lower courts in executing their mandate "to fashion fed-
eral law where federal rights are concerned."' 4  Primary among these
questions was the role the courts should actually play in arbitration litiga-
tion. Indeed, this has been the threshold issue in all subsequent suits
seeking specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate and it goes to
the heart of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Associated Milk Dealers.
Supreme Court guidance on the role of the courts under § 301 was
first announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy", of 1960, which limited
judicial inquiry to "whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate
the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator the power to make the
award he made.""' In American Manufacturing" the employer declined
to arbitrate a claim based on its refusal to reinstate an employee who
had received workmen's compensation for an industrial injury, which
supposedly left him with a 25 percent permanent partial disability. The
same doctor who had supported the employee's earlier claim for work-
men's compensation subsequently certified that he was "able to re-
ternational Ass'n. of Zvachinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317,
a/I'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
9 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1029 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
11 United Steelworkers of America v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir.
1957); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Intl. Union, 187 E.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir.
1951). Contra, Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical R. & M. W., 235 F.2d 298,
300 (2d Cir. 1956); Ass'n. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
210 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir. 1954), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
12 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
13 Id. at 455.
14 Id. at 457.
25 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
10United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
17 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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turn to his former duties without danger to himself or to others." ' Re-
lying upon the seniority provisions of the contract, the union demanded
reinstatement of the employee and, when the company refused to arbitrate,
it brought suit under § 301 (a). The district court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment on an estoppel theory, while the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed on the ground that the grievance was "a frivolous, pat-
ently baseless one, not subject to arbitration under the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the parties."' 9  The Supreme Court reversed.
In Warrior & Gulf ° the collective bargaining agreement contained a
broad arbitration clause but excluded from that process matters which
were "strictly a function of management."'" The contract was silent on
the matter of contracting out part of the firm's work to other companies,
which contributed in part to a lay off of some employees and became the
subject of an employee grievance. When negotiations failed to settle the
dispute and the employer refused to arbitrate, the union brought suit
under § 301(a).
In its findings of fact the district court concluded that the contract
could not be interpreted "to confide in an arbitrator the right to review
the defendant's business judgment in contracting out work"2 2 and that
such a decision is strictly a function of management within the exclu-
sionary clause of the agreement. The Fifth Circuit affirmed,23 but the
Supreme Court reversed and the employer was forced to arbitrate.
The third case in the Steelworkers Trilogy was Enterprise Wheel, 24
in which an arbitrator awarded immediate reinstatement with back pay
as damages for the wrongful discharge of several employees. At the time
of the reinstatement order, the collective bargaining agreement had ex-
pired and the company refused to comply with the award on the ground
18 264 F.2d 624, 625 (6th Cir. 1959).
19 Id. at 628.
20 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
21 Issues which conflict with any Federal statute in its application as established by
Court procedure or matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be
subject to arbitration under this section.
Should differences arise between the Company and the Union or its members em-
ployed by the Company as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this
Agreement, or should any local trouble of any kind arise, there shall be no suspension
of work on account of such differences but an earnest effort shall be made to settle such
differences immediately in the following manner:
Fifth, if agreement has not been reached the matter shall be referred to an impar-
tial umpire for decision. The parties shall meet to decide on an umpire acceptable
to both. If no agreement on selection of an umpire is reached, the parties shalljointly petition the United States Conciliation Service for suggestion of a list of um-
pires from which selection will be made. The decision of the umpire shall be final.
Id. at 576-77.
22 168 F.Supp. 702, 705 (S.D. Ala. 1958).
23269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959).
24 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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that the arbitrator exceeded 'his authority in ordering reinstatement after
the term of the contract. The district court ordered the firm to comply
with the award,2' but the Fourth Circuit reversed for the reasons ad-
vanced by the employer?2 6 The Supreme Court upheld the arbitrator.
In all three cases the Court was careful to recognize that the duty to
arbitrate rests on voluntary contractual intent, not statutory command.
But at the same time the Court also determined that federal policy under
§ 301 strongly favors the arbitration of grievances whenever possible.
Consequently, the role of the courts in § 301 litigation was strictly limited
to interpreting the arbitration clause. The Court pointed out that:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage.27
Thus, despite the district court's finding of fact in Warrior & Gulf that
contracting out work was "strictly a function of management" and beyond
the scope of the arbitration clause, the Supreme Court nevertheless re-
quired the employer to arbitrate a contracting out grievance because:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here,
the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad. Since
any attempt by a court to infer such a purpose necessarily comprehends the
merits, the court should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to
become entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a la-
bor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration
clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator.28
A literal application of this language to the issues in Associated Milk
Dealers would suggest that rather than reversing the district court's order
to arbitrate, the Seventh Circuit should have affirmed. Certainly the
arbitration clause itself was broad enough to encompass a dispute over
the application of the most favored nation clause. Moreover, the lan-
guage cited in support of an intent to exclude it from arbitration was
hardly "forceful" or even specific in comparison to the exclusionary
clause of Warrior & Gulf, where arbitration was ordered despite that
clause.29  Note, however, that the order to arbitrate in Associated Milk
25 168 F.Supp. 308 (S.D. W. Va. 1958).
26 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959).
27 363 U.S. at 582-83 (emphasis supplied).
28d. at 584-85.
2 0 But cf. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), where the facts that arbi-
tration could be invoked only at the option of the union and limited to employee grievances
were sufficient evidence of an intent to exclude from arbitration the employer's claim for dam-
ages caused by a walk out. Under the circumstances the Court held that the contract was "...
197i]
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Dealers was granted on a motion for summary judgment and that on re-
view the circuit court found "genuine issues of material fact con-
cerning whether the parties agreed to arbitrate . . . .,,3 The theory of
this finding relies upon the decision in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Living-
ston 1 and cases interpreting it.
Wiley was a case in which an employer signed a collective bargaining
agreement with the union and then merged his business with the Wiley
firm, which continued ,to operate it in substantially the same manner as
before the sale. The union brought suit against Wiley under § 301(a)
to compel the arbitration of a grievance based upon rights under the old
contract; and despite the fact that Wiley had not signed the old agree-
ment, the Supreme Court affirmed the order directing arbitration. In
doing so the Court established a new tenet of national labor policy which
holds that under circumstances similar to the Wiley case a successor
employer can be bound by the provisions of his predecessor's labor con-
tract. Then interpreting the old contract, the Court held Wiley bound to
arbitrate.
More important to the present inquiry is the opinion's delineation of
the role of the judiciary in § 301 litigation. In contrast to earlier de-
cisions which focused upon the limits of judicial authority under § 301,
Wiley in part addressed itself to judicial powers under that section. Thus,
unless the power is expressly conferred upon the arbitrator himself,
the court should decide the question of arbitrability:
The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission
to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bar-
gaining agreement does in fact create such a duty. Thus, just as an em-
ployer has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it has not agreed to arbi-
trate so a fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause
does not bind it at all.82
Such language could be considered the basis for greater judicial participa-
tion in § 301 litigation, particularly when the contract itself is unclear
about the scope of arbitration and is supplemented by some collateral
agreement, such as the letter concerning potential competition written pur-
suant to the new Associated Milk Dealers contract.
Courts are clearly within the boundaries of the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy when interpreting exclusionary language contained within the collec-
tive bargaining agreement itself. Indeed, Warrior & Gulf was just
such a case and was reversed only because the lower courts inquired too
deeply into the merits of the grievance, which is the province of the
not susceptible to a construction that the company was bound to arbitrate its claim for dam-
ages..." and allowed the employer to proceed with his suit under § 301. 370 U.S. at 241.
30 422 F.2d at 550.




arbitrator. The limitation upon the scope of judicial inquiry to what
might be called prima fade arbitrability is the source of disagreement
among the circuits over the admissibility of evidence of the parties' bar-
gaining history. Justice Brennan addressed himself to this question in
his concurring opinion to the Steelworkers Trilogy. Referring to the
exclusionary clause in Warrior & Gulf, he said:
Here, a court may be required to examine the substantive provisions of
the contract to ascertain whether the parties have provided that contract-
ing out shall be a "function of management." If a court may delve into
the merits to the extent of inquiring whether the parties have expressly
agreed whether or not contracting out was a "function of management,"
why was it error for the lower court here to evaluate the evidence of bar-
gaining history for the same purpose? 33
Representative of a strict approach to the admissibility of evidence of
bargaining history is the Abel134 case, which reached the Fourth Circuit
after a judgment on the pleadings sustained the employer's request for
arbitration. Much like the Associated Milk Dealers contract, the Abell
agreement called for negotiations should the employer decide to introduce
certain technologies into the plant.35 Introduction of those technologies
precipitated a dispute which led to the company's suit to compel arbitra-
tion under § 301. In considering the motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, the district court rejected a union proffer of evidence of bargain-
ing history and said that since it was unable to decide the issue of cover-
age with positive assurance either way, the question should be for the
arbitrator.38  Citing the Warrior & Gulf statement that "only the most
forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can
prevail," 1 the union argued that the district court should have received
its "most forceful evidence."
The Fourth Circuit assigned two reasons for rejecting that agument.
First, the contract itself provided that the arbitrator should decide all
differences over contract interpretation, including whether "the disputed
issue is covered by the terms of this contract, and including the interpre-
tation of all language contained in this contract."3" The court's second
reason for rejecting the union's argument that its evidence was admissible
was:
33363 U.S. at 572 (concurring opinion).
34 A. S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12, 338 F.2d 190 (4th Cit. 1964).
35 It should be noted that the Associated Milk Dealers contract also called for negotiations
should a particular event, i.e., a change in market conditions, occur. However, unlike the Abell
court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, "[r]eference in the contract [and the ensuing letter]
to meetings 'with the dealers for the purpose of negotiating' ...suggest negotiation through
collective bargaining and not arbitration." 422 F.2d at 551. Thus, the question for the dis-
trict court to decide on remand is the scope of that exclusion.
30230 F.Supp. 962,966-67 (D. Md. 1964).
37 363 U.S. at 585.
38 338 F.2d at 192, 194.
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If the meaning of section 3(k) [of the contract] as it pertains to the
situation before us were entirely dear it would become the duty of the
court to declare that meaning. But since we agree that the meaning is not
dear beyond rational debate, we hold that the court correctly referred the
issue of arbitrability to the tribunal the parties previously expressly agreed
upon, namely, the Board of Arbitration itself. Both the language and the
philosophy of the agreement make it the function of the Board of Arbi-
tration to decide the issue of arbitrability a 9
In other words, if a reasonable construction of the agreement would hold
the grievance arbitrable, the trial court should have ordered arbitra-
tion, even though the Board of Arbitration might ultimately find the
grievance nonarbitrable. 40  The reason for this solution is that national
policy favors the expertise of arbitrators over that of the courts in settling
labor disputes.
The adoption of a strict policy against the admissibility of evidence of
bargaining history in § 301 cases encourages the use of summary proce-
dures not involving a full scale trial. This certainly advances national
policy favoring the arbitration of labor disputes and is probably justified
in those situations where the contract itself specifically excludes a matter
from arbitration. But although national policy favors arbitration, it does
not compel it where the parties have not adopted that form of resolving
their disputes. Thus, the use of summary procedures to order arbitration
where it has not in fact been agreed upon runs contrary to the equally
valid goal of upholding the intent of the parties.
The evidentiary conflict usually occurs in those cases in which arbitra-
bility is the subject of a collateral or special agreement. In the ab-
sence of other evidence, a court is then faced with the dilemma of con-
sidering collective bargaining history or abdicating its responsibility to
determine "whether or not the [partyl was bound to arbitrate, as well
as what issues it must arbitrate .... -41 Thus, even in the Second and
Fifth Circuits where evidence of bargaining history is ordinarily inadmis-
sible, such evidence is considered "where the contract claim and its re-
lationship to the written contract is vague or unclear. ,"42 How-
ever, under no circumstances "... will the courts examine bargaining
39 Id. at 195.
40Accord, Communication Workers of America v. S. W. Bell Tel. Co., 415 F.2d 35 (5th
Cir. 1969); IUE v. General Electric Co., 332 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
928 (1964); Ass'n. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 283
F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1960).
41John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964), citing, Atkinson v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962).
42 Communications Workers of America v. S. W. Bell Tel. Co., 415 F.2d 35, 40 (5th Cir.
1969); Strauss v. Silvercup, Inc., 353 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1965).
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history where judicial construction of the arbitration clause in question
would involve the resolution of the underlying dispute." 3
Perhaps the real difference between the circuits over the admissibil-
ity of collective bargaining history is the relative weight they assign in
each case to the competing policies of individual versus national determi-
nation of the manner in which labor disputes should be resolved. The
Labor Management Relations Act represents a compromise between the
two in that it expressly affirms the principle of voluntary agreement
while strongly favoring arbitration as the preferable method among those
available. So, as indicated earlier, the Abell court declined further in-
quiry and ordered arbitration when the contract did not conclusively
exclude a matter from arbitration. Yet when confronted with very simi-
lar language pertaining to "negotiations," the Seventh Circuit in Associ-
ated Milk Dealers remanded the case for further inquiry into the intent
of the parties because "[bjargaining history is relevant in determining
whether parties intended to submit a particular dispute to arbitration.""'
It is submitted that the latter approach is consistent with the Supreme
Court's command that "[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of cover-
age"4" so long as the courts do not thereby usurp the arbitrator's role of
deciding the merits of the underlying dispute.
III. THE ANTITRUST CLAIMS
Up to this point the discussion has concerned itself with the labor
policy considerations in Associated Milk Dealers separate from the anti-
trust claims advanced in the case. Because the most favored nation clause
affected both areas of law, the focus of what follows will be upon the
antitrust aspects of the case and their interaction with the labor policies
examined above.
43 Communications Workers of America v. S. W. Bell Tel. Co., 415 F.2d 35, 40 n. 11 (5th
Cir. 1969).
'4422 F.2d at 551. In Strauss v. Silvercup, 353 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1965), the court said at
558:
But the mere fact that neither of two proffered interpretations of an exclusionary
clause, one of which would permit arbitration, the other of which would prevent it, is
frivolous or unreasonable on its face, does not mean, as the trial court apparently be-
lieved, that the court must order the parties to proceed to arbitration. We believe
that the trial court should have accepted proffered proof relevant to the intentions of
the parties at the time they drafted their agreement. The duty of arbitrate being
contractual in origin, the court must make an effort to construe the extent of that con-
tractual duty, rather than force arbitration even of arbitrability upon parties who
did not bind themselves to such a submission. Further inquiry may well enable the
trial court to say with positive assurance that the exclusionary clause covers this dis-
pute, so that the request for an order compelling arbitration should be denied. On
the other hand, further inquiry may also indicate that the trial court cannot positively
declare that the parties intended to exclude the dispute from arbitration-in which
case, the trial court must issue an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration.
4 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583
(1960).
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In addition to its contract interpretation defenses, the Milk Drivers
Union also argued that because the most favored nation clause violated
the Sherman Act it should be relieved of its duty to arbitrate a grievance
arising under it. The Seventh Circuit held that summary dismissal of
this claim was error and agreed that if the union could prove the clause
violative of the Sherman Act, it would be relieved of its duty to arbi-
trate. Two issues arise with respect to that decision. One is the validity
of the claim itself. The other is the court's refusal to allow an arbitra-
tor even to consider the merits of that defense.
Concerning the validity of the antitrust claim, the union argued that a
most favored nation clause violates the Sherman Act4" on the basis of
United Mine Workers v. Pennington17  Pennington was a suit brought
by the trustees of the United Mine Workers (UMW) welfare fund
against a small coal mining firm for royalties due under the terms of a
multi-employer collective bargaining agreement .4  The employer, Phil-
lips Brothers Coal Co., counterclaimed under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act alleging that the UMW and the trustees had conspired with certain
large mine operaters to eliminate small companies like Phillips from busi-
ness. The crux of the counterclaim was the union's promise to impose
a uniform wage scale upon all mine operators without regard to ability
to pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict favoring the counter-
claim.49 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that although a union is
entitled to seek uniform wages and to make agreements with multi-
employer bargaining units, it "forfeits its exemption from the anti-
trust laws when it is dearly shown that it has agreed with one set of
employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units."50
The Court, nevertheless, reversed the judgment on other grounds. Al-
though in Pennington the Court split into three groups of three justices
each, that principle was recently affirmed by a 5-4 majority in Ramsey v.
United Mine Workers,5" a case resembling Pennington in many ways. "
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
47 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
4 8 The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 virtually ended serious labor
strife in the bituminous coal industry by giving the employees and the UMW high wages and
profit royalties in return for employer control over work practices and automation. The de-
fendant, Phillips Brothers Coal Co, signed the standard agreement in 1953, 1955, and 1956.
381 U.S. at 659.
4 9 Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
50 381 U.S. at 665.
51401 U.S. 302 (1971).
5 2 The challenged "Protective Wage Clause" reads:
During the period of this Contract, the United Mine Workers of America will
not enter into, be a party to, nor will it permit any agreement or understanding cover-
ing any wages, hours or other conditions of work applicable to employees covered by
this Contract on any basis other than those specified in this Contract or any applicable
District Contract. The United Mine Workers of America will diligently perform and
enforce without discrimination or favor the conditions of this paragraph and all other
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Comparing the most favored nation clause with the Pennington
agreement, the union in Associated Milk Dealers argued that both agree-
ments were in essence identical because both surrendered the union's "free-
dom of action with respect to its bargaining policy."" So, while the
Pennington agreement prospectively bound the union to the terms of a
contract with one bargaining unit, the most favored nation clause -accom-
plished the same thing except that it acted retrospectively. Therefore, it
was argued, both clauses should receive identical treatment under the
antitrust laws.
In this regard, the union alleged that the most favored nation clause
was illegal per se. Support for this position has been attributed to lan-
guage following Mr. Justice White's statement of the conditions under
which organized labor loses its antitrust exemption:
One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from
the industry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a
party to the conspiracy. This is true even though the union's part in the
scheme is an undertaking to secure the same wages, hours or other condi-
tions of employment from the remaining employers in the industry. 54
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that such language did not estab-
lish a per se rule because "the actual holding of Pennington requires
proof of the predatory purpose of the agreement between a union and
the employers." 5
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit was not prepared to dismiss
the antitrust claim, as the district court had done, because it read Penning-
ton to require an analysis of predatory purpose and anticompetitive
effect before such practices could be condemned under the Sherman
Act. Thus, the union argued that even if a most favored nation clause is
not anticompetitive when applied to milk dealers, the Jewel dairy was not
a milk dealer because it was a captive dairy organized to supply the
needs of Jewel supermarkets. It did not act as an intermediate whole-
saler by purchasing milk from the processors and delivering it to retail
distributors, as was the practice of the milk dealer signatories to the stan-
dard contract. Instead, the Jewel dairy processed and delivered milk
only for the benefit of its own supermarkets. So, application of the most
favored nation clause based upon the Jewel contract would be economi-
cally unjustified because the nature of Jewel's dairy operation entitled
terms and conditions of this Contract and will use and exercise its continuing best
efforts to obtain full compliance therewith by each and all the parties signatory thereto.
401 U.S. at 304-305.
53 Brief for Appellant at 31-36, Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, 422
F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970), citing, 381 U.S. at 668.
5 4 Comment, Union-Employer Agreements and the Antitrust Laws: The Pennington and
jewel Tea Cases, 114 U. PA. L REv. 901, 909 (1966), citing, 381 U.S. at 665-66.
59422 F.2d at 553. Accord, Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
seating).
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it to more favorable terms than those given the complainant-milk dealers.
If the union could show that imposition of the standard area contract
upon Jewel would have been economically unjustified, it would not only
bolster its argument that the parties never intended the most favored
nation clause to be triggered by the Jewel contract, but would also support
the claim of prohibited anticompetitive effect. Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that a remand for a hearing of the evidence on both
of these issues was appropriate.
It is at this point in the litigation that a conflict between the policies
of antitrust and labor law could arise, if the Seventh Circuit was correct
in holding that courts are the only appropriate forum for the resolution of
antitrust claims. The problem involves the scope of judicial inquiry
on remand. In addition to the question of Jewel's status as a milk dealer,
proof of predatory purpose and anticompetitive effect could necessitate a
judicial inquiry into collective bargaining history. That such evidence
is relevant and admissible in an antitrust inquiry is shown by the Su-
preme Court's treatment of similar evidence in Pennington and Ramsey
v. United Mine Workers." In Pennington, a substantial portion of the
defendant's counterclaim was based upon evidence of collective bar-
gaining negotiations between the union and the larger coal companies.
The admission of such evidence was apparently accepted by a majority of
the justices as legitimate proof of an illegal conspiracy because evidence
of unilateral union activity or of the labor contract alone would have been
insufficient to sustain a Sherman Act allegation.57
However, if on the remand of Associated Milk Dealers the district
court must admit evidence of collective bargaining history in order to rule
on the union's antitrust claim, won't it necessarily decide some of the
merits of the underlying labor grievance, which as a matter of labor law
is precisely what the Supreme Court sought to avoid by its Steelworker
Trilogy policy? In terms of labor law the issue for the court in Associ-
ated Milk Dealers is whether the parties chose arbitration or negotia-
tion as the method to resolve their dispute over the application of the
most favored nation clause in light of the Jewel contract. Absent the
antitrust claim, the district court would resolve that question without im-
pinging on the arbitrator's power to decide the merits of the employ-
ers' claim, which was that the Jewel contract in fact triggered the opera-
5 6 The Court was also inclined to examine evidence of collective bargaining history in Meat
Cutters Union v. jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), a companion case to Pennington in
which the Court was similarly divided into three groups of three justices each.
5 7 In the Opinion of the Court Mr. Justice White said that an antitrust violation could not
be proven only on the basis of union behavior in seeking uniform wages. There must be a
showing that the union conspired with one group of employers to impose the uniform wages
on other bargaining units. Note 2 to the Opinion of the Court mentioned without comment-
ing upon the sufficiency of other evidence of conspiracy in the case, which in large part consisted
of collective bargaining negotiations. 381 U.S. at 665-66.
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tion of the most favored nation clause. A limited inquiry into collective
bargaining history would have been appropriate provided the district
court did not thereby reach the merits of that grievance. But since the
antitrust claim is present and since the Seventh Circurit declared that it
must be resolved in court before there can be a duty to arbitrate, the district
court is now faced with a dilemma.
Mindful that it must not impinge upon the labor aribtrator's province
of inquiry, the court must attempt to resolve the antitrust claim without
deciding whether the most favored nation clause in fact applies to the
Jewel contract. If the clause is inapplicable, then the grounds for assert-
ing an antitrust violation would become moot as to the crux of the suit.
So, the court might logically try to assume without deciding that the
clause was triggered by the Jewel contract. The next question would be
whether that is a violation of the Sherman Act, which under Penning-
ton necessitates a rule of reason inquiry into collective bargaining his-
tory to see if the agreement was motivated by a predatory purpose. But
that purpose cannot be characterized as unreasonable or predatory with-
out deciding what the court originally stated it did not want to decide,
i.e., whether the clause is triggered by the Jewel contract. Furthermore,
since the most favored nation clause might be reasonable as applied to
milk dealers but not as to others, the court might additionally be re-
quired to decide whether the Jewel dairy is a milk dealer, which is another
question that would have been resolved by a labor arbitrator absent the
antitrust claim. In short, the antitrust allegations made in this case could
entirely defeat any possibility of arbitrating the labor grievance out of
which it arose. The reason is judicial reluctance to allow both claims
to be resolved by the arbitration process.
In this regard, courts which have considered the matter have uniformly
rejected arbitration as the method of resolving antitrust claims.58 Cit-
ing Silvercup Bakers, Inc. v. Fink Baking Corp.- the Seventh Circuit
declared:
Arbitrators are ill-equipped to interpret the antitrust laws and their con-
sideration of possible violations would add little. Indeed an agreement
requiring arbitration of private antitrust claims would probably be unen-
forceable .... 60
Silvercup was an action in which the plaintiff sued a baker's union for con-
spiring with the plaintiff's competitors to eliminate it from a particular
5 8 See generally 3 A.L.R. Fed. 918 (1970) and the symposium on antitrust and arbitration
in 44 N.Y.U. L REv. 1069 (1969). But cf. Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co.,
Civil No. 68,213 (C.D. Cal., April 29, 1968), rev'd, 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970) in which
the district court's order to arbitrate antitrust claims was reversed but only because ". .. the
parties agreed to arbitrate antitrust claims which were not in existence and the nature and effect
of which were unknown when the agreement was made." 426 F.2d at 984.
5 273 F.Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Silvercup].
00 422 F.2d at 552.
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market by causing the mass resignation of plaintiff's employees. The
union sought to compel the arbitration of this claim as a grievance covered
by its arbitration agreement with the employer. The court ruled that,
absent specific exclusionary language in the contract, it must be assumed
that neither party intended to forego their rights to a judicial determina-
tion of their tort claims against one another.61  Furthermore, it doubted
the legality of such an agreement or the enforceability of an award once
made.62
In a different factual context the Second Circuit considered the merits
of ordering the arbitration of antitrust claims arising out of a trademark
licensing agreement and decided that the court was the appropriate
forum. 3 Among the reasons given for its decision, the court cited the
potentially monumental effect of antitrust violations on the public at
large, the fact that arbitration clauses can often be the result of a contract
of adhesion, and lack of antitrust expertise by commercial arbitrators.
Thus, the interest of the parties as well as that of the public was thought
best served by deciding antitrust claims in court.
Although this attitude has been criticized, it represents the nearly unan-
imous view of the courts;64 and given the present scope and function of
the arbitration process, it is not hard to see why. For example, in Penning-
ton, the Court said:
We think it beyond question that a union may conclude a wage agreement
with the multi-employer bargaining unit without violating the antitrust
laws and that it may as a matter of its own policy, and not by agreement
with all or part of the employers of that unit, seek the same wages from
other employers.65
As a matter of labor law, a uniform wage scale is recognized as a legiti-
mate union objective66 which could properly be affirmed in the course of
arbitration proceedings. But even if a uniform scale is purposely used to
drive out management's competitors, as alleged in Pennington, or merely
has the effect of doing so, it may nevertheless retain its legitimacy
as a labor objective and be upheld despite its anticompetitive effects. An
arbitrator with expertise in the coal mining industry could easily con-
clude that the elimination of competition from the small mine operators
would ultimately benefit the workers and remaining employers more
than the continued existence of those small firms. On the other hand,
a court is bound to enforce antitrust policy favoring the preservation of
61273 F.Supp. at 163, ctitg, Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Emp. Local U.,
359 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1966).
62 Cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
6 3 American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
64 See note 58 supra.
65 381 U.S. at 664.
66 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503 (1940).
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such competition; and given that additional objective, it might not be as
sympathetic to a uniform wage agreement with predatory purpose and
anticompetitive effect.
However, at least one author has suggested that the dangers in allow-
ing arbitrators to decide antitrust claims have been overemphasized and
that even within the present structure of arbitration proceedings the
public interest in the outcome of private antitrust disputes would be
adequately protected. 7 Indeed, the public is likely to suffer equally grave
injuries from ill-advised labor or antitrust decisions regardless of the
forum. Further, if the public's interest in the outcome of private anti-
trust suits is as great as is alleged, why does it remain subject to the
right of the parties to effect an out-of-court settlement of their dispute?
The settlement of antitrust claims apparently differs from the arbitra-
tion process only in the absence of a third party who is formally desig-
nated an arbitrator. Therefore, looking beyond the rhetoric that arbi-
tration is inappropriate to the resolution of antitrust claims, more thought
should be given to the reasons why arbitration is considered appro-
priate in one area and an anathema in another. This would seem par-
ticularly true of a case involving both labor and antitrust law, where an
established arbitration process is readily available and where submission
of both claims to arbitration would avoid the evidentiary problems of
collective bargaining history discussed above.
IV. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
Associated Milk Dealers has provided a convenient forum for the ex-
amination of certain policies in antitrust and labor law and how those
policies interact. First, it should be noted that, antitrust defenses aside,
the Seventh Circuit declined to affirm the summary judgment to arbitrate
the employer's claim because it was not sufficiently convinced that the
parties had agreed to resolve such a dispute in that way. Although that
action might be criticized on a literal reading of cases like the Steelworkers
Trilogy, it is clearly consistent with the repeated emphasis by the Supreme
Court on the contractual nature of the duty to arbitrate.
As to the antitrust issues, the Seventh Circuit was certainly on
solid ground when it criticized the district court for summarily dismiss-
ing the union's antitrust challenge to the most favored nation clause.
It was equally correct in holding that Pennington does not make such
agreements illegal per se but rather requires proof of predatory purpose
and anticompetitive effect. Further, reservation of the antitrust issues.
to the court rather than the arbitrator places the Seventh Circuit firmly
within the line of reasoning adopted by most courts which have considered'
the issue. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility that on remand
67 Asken, Arbitration and Antifrust-Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L REv. 1097 (1969).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the district court will hear evidence and resolve issues in its determina-
tion of the antitrust claim which could ultimately restrict the arbitration
of the underlying labor grievance contrary to national labor policy.
But whether the concern is national labor policy or improving the
efficiency and expertise of the judicial process, the case in favor of the
arbitration of antitrust claims is an appealing one, particularly when the
suit involves labor grievances which would otherwise go to arbitration.
At the very least, arbitrators could act as expert fact finders whose
antitrust judgments would be subject to judicial review for possible mis-
application of the law. In this regard, the character of arbitration might
have to be modified somewhat to include such things as written find-
ings of fact, but the resulting economies would seem to outweigh
whatever disadvantages might accrue. In other words, although courts
have been squarely opposed to the arbitration of antitrust disputes, the
proposal deserves more than the rhetorical consideration it has been
accorded to date.
Kurt L. Schultz
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